Corruption and externalities: Assessing the role of intentions

Carlos Maximiliano Senci

doi:10.5565/rev/papers.2630

Corrupció i externalitats: avaluar el paper de les intencions

Autors/ores

Carlos Maximiliano Senci Institut de Recerques Econòmiques i Socials del Sud (IIESS). Universitat Nacional del Sud. CONICET

PDF (EN)

Resum

Els estudis experimentals modelen la corrupció com una forma de comportament establert sobre la base de relacions de reciprocitat que genera externalitats negatives per a tercers. Els resultats sobre com les externalitats negatives influeixen en les decisions relacionades amb la corrupció dels individus no són concloents. Si bé s’ha demostrat que les intencions (imputades) tenen un impacte en les preferències socials i les avaluacions d’amabilitat dels participants en una àmplia gamma de situacions, poca cosa se sap sobre si els participants prenen en consideració i de quina manera les intencions (imputades) de tercers en contextos de corrupció. La suposada diferència en avaluar les externalitats en funció de si afecten jugadors actius o jugadors passius té implicacions importants per a la corrupció en la vida real. En molts casos de corrupció, les externalitats negatives afecten (conjunts de) «jugadors passius», com «la societat en general». En altres casos, no obstant això, jugadors més actius (com el cap polític d’un departament governamental) són objecte d’externalitats negatives. Els models de reciprocitat prediuen que les avaluacions d’amabilitat respecte dels tercers que són objecte d’externalitats negatives entrarien en les consideracions de les parts en una transacció corrupta en el darrer cas, però no quan es tracta de jugadors passius. Tanmateix, aquesta important predicció no ha estat provada empíricament. Trobem que les intencions de tercers no afecten el comportament directament sinó que afecten la forma en què es percep l’amabilitat dels altres.

Paraules clau

corrupció, externalitats, reciprocitat, intencions, experiment

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Biografia de l'autor/a

Carlos Maximiliano Senci, Institut de Recerques Econòmiques i Socials del Sud (IIESS). Universitat Nacional del Sud. CONICET

Llicenciat en Filosofia, màster en Dret amb orientació a l’Anàlisi Econòmica i doctor en Filosofia per la Universitat Nacional del Sud (Bahía Blanca, Argentina). Línies principals de recerca: ciències socials experimentals, normes socials, corrupció, filosofia política. Actualment és becari postdoctoral a l’Institut de Recerques Econòmiques i Socials del Sud (IIESS) - UNS - CONICET.