Corrupción y externalidades: evaluar el papel de las intenciones
Resumen
Los estudios experimentales modelan la corrupción como una forma de comportamiento establecido sobre la base de relaciones de reciprocidad que genera externalidades negativas para terceros. Los resultados acerca de cómo las externalidades negativas influyen en las decisiones relacionadas con la corrupción de los individuos no son concluyentes. Si bien se ha demostrado que las intenciones (imputadas) tienen un impacto en las preferencias sociales y las evaluaciones de amabilidad de los participantes en una amplia gama de situaciones, poco se sabe sobre si los participantes toman en consideración y de qué manera las intenciones (imputadas) de terceros en contextos de corrupción. La supuesta diferencia al evaluar las externalidades en función de si afectan a jugadores activos o a jugadores pasivos tiene implicaciones importantes para la corrupción en la vida real. En muchos casos de corrupción, las externalidades negativas afectan a (conjuntos de) «jugadores pasivos», como «la sociedad en general». En otros casos, sin embargo, jugadores más activos (como el jefe político de un departamento gubernamental) son objeto de externalidades negativas. Los modelos de reciprocidad predicen que las evaluaciones de amabilidad respecto a los terceros que son objeto de externalidades negativas entrarían en las consideraciones de las partes en una transacción corrupta en el último caso, pero no cuando se trata de jugadores pasivos. Esta importante predicción, sin embargo, no ha sido empíricamente probada. Encontramos que las intenciones de terceros no afectan al comportamiento directamente sino que afectan a la forma en que se percibe la amabilidad de los demás.
Palabras clave
corrupción, externalidades, reciprocidad, intenciones, experimentoCitas
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